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Review Essay
War in the Information Age
Robert M. Cassidy
Kiras, James D. Special Operations and Strategy from World War II to the
War on Terrorism. New York: Routledge, 2006.
Moyar, Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil
War to Iraq. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009.
Rid, Thomas, and Marc Hecker. War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the
Information Age. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2009.
The following essay captures the relevance of these three works to the prolonged irregular war against the Taliban and al Qaeda. Based on the arguments so
aptly put forth in these studies, this essay posits that irregular warfare in the twentyfirst century requires intuitive and creative leaders who can masterfully weave information operations, combined general-purpose operations, and special operations to
undermine irregular adversaries through fully complementary lethal and nonlethal
actions. The four authors bring new insight to irregular warfare strategy in general,
and to the ongoing war in particular. This irregular war is a protracted struggle, one
that will see persistent conflict and presence in Afghanistan and other regions for decades. It remains, however, a war without a name. The US government has not yet
exhibited a great deal of coherence or consistency in describing it. The “Global War
on Terrorism,” “Long War,” “Persistent Conflict,” and “Overseas Contingency Operations” are not especially useful terms. Today’s battle is an effort aimed at defeating a revolution that conflates insurgency and terrorism and reaches across regions.
The enemy, comprising Taliban guerrillas, al Qaeda, and its franchises, pursues a
strategy of exhaustion and erosion against the West. To use John B. Alexander’s
term, “World War X” is an irregular war unlimited in scope and is mainly a matter of
matching ideas with actions to sustain the support of the relevant populations.
The first work reviewed is Rid and Hecker’s War 2.0. It is topical because
it analyzes the effects of media and information on the current struggle to influence
the perception of the populations within and across insurgencies. In the introduction,
the authors correctly state that it can be difficult for an external military force to sustain a good public image while prosecuting combat operations among a population.
The authors point out that irregular fighters often find it easier to appear successful
in the information environment, simply by blowing up things. The counterinsurgents,
on the other hand, face the far-more difficult task of building governments and institutions. Destruction has an immediate informational impact, whereas construction
projects are slow to achieve effects. Successful counterinsurgency, in other words,
“is much less attention-grabbing and much more resource-consuming than effective
insurgency.” A corollary of irregular warfare in the information age is the advent of
modern communications technology and the resurgence in insurgency. Together,
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they have broken the military and the media’s shared monopoly on information and
elevated the salience of public perception in irregular war. War 2.0 sees the public and
the media as the highest priority, the central battlefield where information is preponderantly open source, public, and intended for external use. The traditional division of
labor between political, economic, and military elements is largely absent in the new
style of conflict, where modern information technology amplifies acts of violence. The
book includes chapters on Israel, the United Kingdom, Hezbollah, and al Qaeda.
To better blend all three books in a relevant manner, this essay focuses on
those chapters that explain the notion of information warfare in the context of Afghanistan. In such a setting, the production of information, the easy availability of
consumer electronics, the Internet, and the changing culture of consumption have
had a disproportionate impact on insurgent strategy. Information technology empowers the insurgent more than the counterinsurgent in irregular war because it makes
political violence more complex. It opens a broader range of militant and political
action. The new information domain has enhanced armed conflict, and irregular war,
as a continuation of policy and political discourse.
Technology affects the information environment of irregular warfare in four
ways. First, for the insurgent, technological advances generally have mitigated the
tactical risks of employing media-based forms of influence. Second, the new information environment facilitates participation in media work and changes the definition of public information. Anonymous online interaction, however, can facilitate
illicit offline action. Third, the recruitment pool for radical Islamist militants and insurgents is about to grow more quickly because the gap between Internet access in Africa and the Middle East, vis-à-vis the United States and Europe, is on the verge of
closing. This accomplishment means a larger number of potentially disenfranchised
and radicalized Muslims will have Internet access in the coming years. Last, and most
saliently, modern information technology alters the influencing of popular support
for both regular and irregular warriors. War 2.0 moves beyond the Clausewitzian and
Maoist perspectives regarding the population in war. Clausewitz’s classic trinitarian
framework was limited to traditional army-against-army wars and did not sufficiently anticipate irregular warfare among the people. Irregular warfare in the information age also questions the enduring validity of Mao’s metaphor of insurgents being
fish among the people, who act as the water, the terrain of people’s wars.
Al Qaeda, for example, was an insurgent movement without a traditionally
local popular support base following the Soviet-Afghan war. In Rid and Hecker’s
words, “It attracted a pan-Islamic global crop of fighters, it was financed by radical
sympathizers from across the world, graduates of training camps operated worldwide, and the al Qaeda leadership planned attacks without geographical limitation.”
Modern information mechanisms have made it easier for global guerrillas to carry
out operations, adapt, and survive, without the classical notion of popular support.
Al Qaeda and its ilk, however, still require a physical, territorial sanctuary in ungoverned or state-sponsored spaces. The new virtual platform has not eliminated the
need for physical safe haven, but it has made some groups less dependent on direct
and traditional popular support. Two of the six paradoxes of media operations in the
information age merit noting. The insurgent benefits from violence, while the counterinsurgent suffers from it; and the insurgent initiates, whereas the counterinsurgent reacts. When irregulars are able to initiate violence, even reprehensible attacks
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against civilians, they create the perception that the government security forces are
incapable of protecting the population.
In instances where government security forces initiate violence that inadvertently results in alleged civilian casualties, insurgents, such as the Taliban, are often quick to initiate propaganda that exaggerates or distorts the actual consequences
of the event. Rid and Hecker devote a chapter to explaining how the resurgent Taliban adapted and embraced media and information operations starting in 2003. The
new Taliban have readily evolved since they regrouped in Pakistan. The old Taliban banned most media, but the revived Taliban now recognize the importance of
news media in determining the outcome of an irregular war of ideas. Learning from
al Qaeda’s success with information warfare, the authors illumine, the Taliban now
rely on the media as a powerful instrument in waging psychological warfare. The
Taliban global media campaign has two audiences: their supporters and potential
guerrilla recruits, and the populations of their enemies. The number of Coalition-induced “civilian casualties” has become an important focus of Taliban information
operations. In some instances, Taliban spokespersons have called the international
media in Kabul within minutes of a NATO airstrike, getting out their message on civilian casualties ahead of the official Coalition statement, thus shaping the information environment to fit the insurgents’ narrative. Regardless of whether the Taliban
messages are inaccurate or exaggerated, the fact that the Coalition has accidentally
hit civilian targets lends a degree of advanced credibility to the opposition’s propaganda. The objective of information operations in irregular warfare is to win the
competition for legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Counterinsurgent leaders
have to employ media in such ways as to enhance operational action. Sustaining
moral rectitude requires creative and intuitive leaders who can match actions with
ideas and information.
The second book analyzes leadership as an explanatory variable for success
in irregular war. A Question of Command posits that success in counterinsurgency
depends above all on building and selecting the right people for key leadership positions, from the tactical to the strategic levels. One of author Mark Moyar’s chief
aims is to identify those critical characteristics of effective counterinsurgency leaders. He arrives at ten attributes: initiative, flexibility, creativity, judgment, sociability, charisma, empathy, dedication, integrity, and organization. Brevity dictates
that this essay amplify the most salient of these attributes. Creativity varies between
the tactical and strategic levels, but creative thinkers are essential because they improvise innovative solutions to complex problems. The author defines judgment as
the use of logic and intuition to evaluate problems and make sound decisions. It allows commanders to discern which actions and methods may work against which
insurgents. Dedication, or resilience, is crucial because counterinsurgency requires
a grueling and dangerous operational rhythm. In a ruthlessly Darwinian place such
as Afghanistan, “victory is sometimes decided by perseverance.” Excellent performance in counterinsurgency requires superiority in a substantial number of the attributes but not all of them. Most of them, in part, derive from heredity. Some can
be improved through self-development, but many arise from the culture in which
individuals are immersed. Military culture shapes leaders because the military is a
long-term, closed system. If a military culture eschews counterinsurgency as a core
role, as the US Army did for the last 25 years of the last century, the development
of good counterinsurgency-capable leaders is hampered.
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Moyar studies nine counterinsurgencies through the lens of these leadership traits. His analysis of Vietnam provides a number of interesting explanations
for the discernible improvements in the counterinsurgency methods employed after
General Creighton Abrams succeeded General William Westmoreland. Westmoreland elected to devote American forces to conventional search-and-destroy operations, away from the populace, because they had superior mobility and firepower.
He relied on South Vietnamese soldiers to protect the villages and fight the guerrillas because they had knowledge of and ties to local communities that the American
forces lacked. The South Vietnamese government did divert many of its forces to
counter the insurgents in and around the villages. These forces, however, generally
performed miserably for two reasons. First, the Americans had trained and equipped
the Vietnamese in their mirror image, to fight conventionally against conventional
adversaries. Second, poor leadership was endemic among the Vietnamese. The results of this strategy were not at all surprising: a reluctance to pursue the enemy, the
employment of inappropriate tactics, desertion, and the mistreatment of the civilian populace.
After he replaced Westmoreland, Abrams directed that American forces employ small units in the populated areas, in concert with South Vietnamese forces.
Abrams opted for a one-war strategy, wherein American and South Vietnamese forces together focused on securing the population from the guerrillas. General Abrams
improved the approach to the counterinsurgency in a number of ways, to include
overseeing a marked improvement in South Vietnamese leadership. Moyar provides
a threefold explanation for the majority of these improvements:
• The Hue massacre during the enemy’s 1968 Tet offensive convinced South
Vietnam’s elites of the gruesome fate they faced if they were to lose.
• The reduction of American forces persuaded the South Vietnamese leaders
that they had to persevere to avoid ultimate defeat.
• Also, the increased American leverage induced South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu to replace inept leaders.
Westmoreland had focused almost solely on the American forces’ efforts to
destroy Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units, whereas Abrams had emphasized the
improvement among South Vietnamese forces as well as a substantial increase in the
number and quality of the American advisers working with them. Westmoreland’s
inattention to the quality of South Vietnamese commanders was a critical flaw. The
thing that most distinguished Abrams from his predecessor was the fact that he regularly compelled President Thieu to replace inept commanders. Westmoreland never
resolved the cumbersome US and South Vietnamese command arrangements that
created disunity of command, purpose, and effort. Similar problems plagued the US
effort in Afghanistan for several years.
Moyar’s chapter on Afghanistan notes that US forces during the first years
of the resurgent insurgency arrived with little knowledge of counterinsurgency.
Units were forced to adapt under fire; previously the US military had largely focused on its preferred conventional war paradigm. In addition, the author asserts,
many regular Army commanders lacked creativity, flexibility, and other attributes
more in demand during counterinsurgency than conventional war. The contrast between Special Forces officers, who often exhibited the desired attributes, and the
regular Army officers was discernible. Special Forces leaders worked closely with
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their indigenous Afghan partners, thriving on dispersed operations. Early in the
war, too many commanders tended to operate out of a few large bases from which
their forces would sortie for large sweeping and raiding operations, before returning to base in a week or two. These raids did inflict losses on the Taliban, and in
some instances on the civilian populace, but they failed to halt the Taliban from
recruiting among the population. Moyar asserts that those “commanders with creativity, flexibility, judgment, and initiative figured out quickly how to swim in the
unfamiliar waters into which they had been thrown.” For example, when Lieutenant General David W. Barno became the Coalition commander in Afghanistan, he
shifted the focus to the counterinsurgency fundament of population protection. He
assigned American commanders ownership of geographic areas and directed them
to send small units into the Afghan villages to patrol relentlessly and persist among
the people.
The problem was that there were never enough forces to persist among 31
million people in a rugged nation the size of Texas. The Pentagon, under Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, opted for a very small force, misconstruing the lessons of the Soviet-Afghanistan war to be that the Russians lost because they had
too many forces. In reality, the Soviets lost because they had too few of the wrong
kind of forces. They attempted to fight this conflict with the mechanized forces optimized for a big war in Europe, employing an entirely inappropriate scorched-earth
strategy. Also, there was no apparent US plan for what to do once the Taliban were
defeated. According to Moyar, the quick defeat of the Taliban in 2001 persuaded
the American prophets touting a revolution in military affairs that new technologies
would allow the US military to find and destroy the Taliban from the air, making a
large number of ground forces unnecessary. This over-reliance on airpower ended
up inflicting an inordinate number of civilian casualties. Finally, to rebuild the nation and provide security against the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda, the Pentagon and President Hamid Karzai forced themselves to rely on the warlords. Many
of these tribal leaders were venal and vicious men, “who put personal gain before
the good of the country, committed atrocities, engaged in mobster activities, and
showed an inability to cooperate with others.” The Coalition funded the expansion
of these warlord-led Afghan militia forces to the detriment of the Afghan people.
In a number of instances, the corruption and abuse the warlords wrought alienated
the local populace.
The last book examined, Special Operations and Strategy from World War
II to the War on Terrorism, provides insight from strategic theory and special operations best practices that remain relevant to the campaign in Afghanistan and generally for irregular warfare in the information age. Special operations forces fulfill a
range of indirect and direct roles in countering the insurgency in Afghanistan. Author Jim Kiras provides an unorthodox perspective on attrition and on the utility of
special operations in achieving reduction of the enemy’s resolve at the operational and strategic levels. The essence of his study is that “the cumulative effect of a
number of special operations focused on an enemy’s moral and material vulnerabilities, in conjunction with conventional operations, is a more rapid and less costly
dissolution of an enemy’s will to fight than by conventional means alone.” The collaborative and comprehensive employment of combined general-purpose and special operations forces is crucial to success in Afghanistan. Although a war of ideas
among the 40 million Pashtuns who live along both sides of the Durand Line can-
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not focus exclusively on attrition and destruction, Kiras’s ideas regarding the use of
special operations forces for strategic attrition are salient in the context of the precise and persistent elimination of enemy leadership infrastructure. The calculated
and prudent targeting of Taliban leadership by special operations forces, to physically and psychologically erode key leaders and their sources of support, is one way
to complement the counterinsurgency effort. Executed successfully, these steps can
have operational and strategic impact. This strategy has been an enduring truth of irregular wars in Malaya, Algeria, Vietnam, Rhodesia, Iraq, and elsewhere.
These three books are all worthwhile reads. Together, they provide substance on novel ways to educate and cultivate the type of leaders who can succeed
among the complexities associated with irregular warfare; topical insight regarding
the challenges and opportunities engendered in irregular warfare in the information
age; and an unconventional perspective on attrition and the employment of special
operations forces to achieve strategic effects. Moyar’s book is the most readable
of the three and is primus inter pares. Rid and Hecker’s War 2.0 is clearly a must
read but is not necessarily a facile read. The writing style and structure make it a bit
cumbersome and dense. There is one final critique of War 2.0 and A Question of
Command. It lies in the use of the word “centric” as a hyphenated addendum to “population.” Such a construction is fatuous and banal lexicon that is exceedingly unhelpful since any well-informed and -conceived counterinsurgency in this era would, by
necessity, have to focus on protecting the indigenous population from insurgents, as
well as protecting the people from the American military’s propensity to over-rely on
firepower. To be certain, counterinsurgency is intrinsically about the people.
The Reviewer: Colonel Robert M. Cassidy is a Senior Fellow with the Center for
Advanced Defense Studies and the author of Counterinsurgency and the Global
War on Terror.
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